The Revelation Principle

So far, we've been investigating Dominant-Strategy Incentive-Compatible (DSIC) mechanisms. To be DSIC, this means that

- (1) Every participant in the mechanism has a dominant strategy, no matter what their private valuation is.
- (2) This dominant strategy is *direct revelation*, where the participant truthfully reports all of their private information to the mechanism.

There are mechanisms that satisfy (1) but not (2). Give an example:

For a formal definition of a direct revelation mechanism:

Definition 1. A mechanism is *direct revelation* if it is single-round, sealed-bid, and has action space equal to the type (value) space. That is, an agent can bid any type they might have, and an agent's action *is* bidding a type.

The Revelation Principle and the Irrelevance of Truthfulness

The Revelation Principle states that, given requirement (1), there is no need to relax requirement (2): it comes "for free."

Theorem 1 (Revelation Principle for DSIC Mechanisms). For every mechanism M in which every participant has a dominant strategy (no matter what their private information), there is an equivalent direct-revelation DSIC mechanism M'.

Equivalent here means that as a function of the valuation profile (not bids), the allocation and payment $(x(\mathbf{v}), p(\mathbf{v}))$ are equivalent in both M and M'.

Proof.




Figure 1: Proof of the Revelation Principle. Construction of the direct-revelation mechanism M', given a mechanism M with dominant strategies.

The takeaway from the Revelation Principle (Theorem 1) is that it is without loss to design direct revelation mechanisms. That is, you might as well require your mechanism to be incentive-compatible.

Beyond Dominant-Strategy: Bayesian Settings

There are many reasons why we can't always require dominant strategies when design mechanisms.

- (1) Requiring such a strong concept might not be tractable.
- (2) Agents do not always have dominant strategies! What then?

We'll now introduce the Bayesian setting.

Suppose the valuation v_i of bidder *i* is drawn from a prior distribution F_i .

- CDF $F_i(x) = \Pr_{v_i \sim F_i}[v_i \le x].$
- PDF $f_i(x) = \frac{d}{dx}F_i(x)$.
- Joint distribution \mathbf{F} or \vec{F} .

Unless otherwise noted, we assume that the prior distribution \mathbf{F} is *common knowledge* to all bidders and the mechanism designer (the seller).

Definition 2. A Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) for a joint distribution \mathbf{F} is a strategy profile $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n)$ such that for all i and v, $\sigma_i(v_i)$ is a best-response when other agents play $\sigma_{-i}(\mathbf{v}_{-i})$ when $\mathbf{v}_{-i} \sim \mathbf{F}_{-i} |_{v_i}$.

Claim 1. Consider two identically and independently drawn bidders from F = U[0,1]. It is a (symmetric) BNE for each bidder to bid $\sigma_i(v_i) = v_i/2$ in the first-price auction.

Theorem 2 (Revenue Equivalence). The payment rule and revenue of a mechanism is uniquely determined by its allocation. Hence, any two mechanisms with the same allocation must earn the same revenue.

What is this theorem a corollary of? Prove this for the first-price auction and the Vickrey (secondprice) auction in the above setting!

Proof.

Bayesian Settings

Using notions from the Bayesian setting and how bidders Bayesian update as they learn information, we define three stages of the auction:

- 1. ex ante: Before any information has been drawn; i only knows \mathbf{F} .
- 2. *interim*: Values v_i have been drawn; *i* only knows their own valuation, and thus the updated prior $\mathbf{F}|_{v_i}$.
- 3. ex post: The auction has run and concluded. All bidders know all v_1, \ldots, v_n .

Typically we discuss the ex post allocation and payment rules as a function of all of the values. However, in the Bayesian setting, to reason about BIC, it often makes sense to take in terms of *interim* allocation and payment rules which have the same information as bidder i before the auction is run.

Proof.

Definition 3. We define the *interim* allocation and payment rules in expectation over the updated Bayesian prior given *i*'s valuation:

$$x_i(v_i) = \Pr_{\mathbf{F}}[x_i(\mathbf{v}) = 1 \mid v_i] = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{F}}[x_i(\mathbf{v}) \mid v_i]$$

and

$$p_i(v_i) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{F}}[p_i(\mathbf{v}) \mid v_i].$$

Our definition of Bayesian Incentive-Compatibility then follows:

Definition 4. A mechanism with *interim* allocation rule x and *interim* payment rule p is Bayesian Incentive-Compatible (BIC) if

$$v_i x_i(v_i) - p_i(v_i) \ge v_i x_i(z) - p_i(z) \quad \forall i, v_i, z.$$

Exercises (optional):

- Extend Myerson's Lemma and the payment identity for Bayesian Incentive-Compatible (BIC) mechanisms.
- Extend the Revelation Principle for BIC mechanisms.