Kira Goldner

Postdoctoral Fellow, Columbia University

About me


I am a postdoc in Computer Science at Columbia University hosted by Tim Roughgarden. Specifically, I am an NSF Mathematical Sciences Postdoctoral Research Fellow and a Data Science Institute Postdoctoral Fellow.

I received my PhD in Computer Science & Engineering at the University of Washington, where I was very fortunate to be advised by Anna Karlin. During my PhD, I was very generously supported by a 2017-19 Microsoft Research PhD Fellowship and a 2016-17 Google Anita Borg Scholarship.

My research interests are primarily in algorithmic mechanism design and approximation algorithms, particularly in:

I previously attended Oberlin College where I received a B.A. in Mathematics and minored in Computer Science. I also studied at Budapest Semesters in Mathematics. My Curriculum Vitae can be found here.

Service: I am serving or have served on the program committees for EC 2020, AAAI 2020, EC 2019, NetEcon 2019, MD4SG 2019 (Theory area co-chair), AIES 2018, MD4SG 2018 (PC co-chair), and MD4SG 2017 (PC co-chair).

Resources


Mechanism Design for Social Good (MD4SG):

Menu Complexity:

Publications


Reducing Inefficiency in Carbon Auctions with Imperfect Competition
   With Nicole Immorlica and Brendan Lucier, ITCS 2020.

Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets
   With Moshe Babaioff and Yannai A. Gonczarowski, SODA 2020. [PDF]

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue
   With Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, and Anna R. Karlin, EC 2019. [PDF]
   Awarded Best Paper with Student Lead Authors

Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities
   With Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, and R. Preston McAfee, EC 2019. [PDF]

When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase
   With Meryem Essaidi and S. Matthew Weinberg, MD4SG 2019.

Mechanism Design for Social Good
   With Rediet Abebe, ACM SIGAI AI Matters, 4.3, October 2018. [PDF]

Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing
   With Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, and Amos Fiat, EC 2018. [PDF]

Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents
   With Nikhil R. Devanur, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, and S. Matthew Weinberg, manuscript. [PDF]

Revenue Maximization with an Uncertainty-Averse Buyer
   With Shuchi Chawla, J. Benjamin Miller, and Emmanouil Pountourakis, SODA 2018. [PDF]

A Report on the Workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good
   With Rediet Abebe, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 16.2, June 2018. [PDF]

A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders
   With Anna R. Karlin, WINE 2016. [PDF]

The FedEx Problem (Working Paper)
   With Amos Fiat, Anna R. Karlin, and Elias Koutsoupias, EC 2016. [PDF]

Minimal Partial Languages and Automata
   With F. Blanchet-Sadri and Aidan Shackleton, CIAA 2014. [PDF]

Different Optimal Solutions in Shared Path Graphs
   With Sean McCulloch, MCURCSM 2012. [PDF]

You can also view my papers from Google Scholar.

Teaching