DS 574: Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Fall 2025
Boston University


Course Details

Instructor: Professor Kira Goldner (goldner@).
Office Hours: Tuesday 3:15–4:15pm and by appointment.
Office Location: CCDS 1339.

Lectures:
Tuesday/Thursday 2:00—3:15pm, PSY B47.

Important Links:

Course Description: This course is an introduction to the interdisciplinary area of Algorithmic Mechanism Design: where computational perspectives are applied to economic problems, and economic techniques are brought to problems from computer science. We will explore a broad range of topics at the frontier of new research, starting with some of the fundamentals, such as welfare-maximizing auctions and types of Nash Equilibria. Throughout the semester, the class will also learn about prevalent topics such as (1) Data Science & Incentives, (2) Mechanism Design for Social Good, and (3) optimization and robustness in mechanism design.

The course is aimed at graduate students but will be accessible to motivated advanced undergraduate or masters students with some background in proofs (DS 122), algorithms (DS 320), and probability (MA 581).

Homework: Biweekly homeworks will be posted on Piazza when they become available. Homework must be typed up using LaTeX; here is a quick resource on LaTeX and here is a LaTeX template you may use for the homework. Here is another short guide to LaTeX. You may find it easier to use Overleaf.


Lecture Schedule

Below is a table with that will reflect what we cover in each lecture and will point to corresponding reading material. Lectures listed more than one date in advance are tentative topics. There is no required textbook for this course, as all materials are available online for free and we will switch between materials. Some shorthand for the reading material:

  • R1.x = Tim Roughgarden's AGT lecture notes, lecture x. (Alternatively available in book form here.)
  • R2.x = Tim Roughgarden's AMD lecture notes, lecture x.
  • Hx = Jason Hartline's textbook "Mechanism Design and Approximation," chapter x.
  • Kx = Anna Karlin's textbook "Game Theory, Alive," chapter x. (Also in book form.)
Resources listed are optional, and often multiple versions of the same material are listed so that you can find what is best suited to you.

Date Topic Resources
Sep 2 Overview and Policies, Intro to AGT Worksheet, Notes, Slides, R1.1-2
Sep 4 Projects, Incentive Compatibility, & The Revelation Principle Worksheet, Notes, R1.3-4, H2.10, Project Description, Project Rubric
Sep 9 Bayesian Settings and Revenue Equivalence Worksheet, Notes, H2.3,2.5,2.7
Sep 11 Myersonian Virtual Welfare and Quantile Space Worksheet, Notes, R1.5, H3.3-4
Sep 16 Ironing Virtual Values Worksheet, Notes, H3.3.3-4
Sep 18 Multidimensional Settings and VCG, Interdependent Values I Worksheet, Notes, R1.7
Sep 23 Discussions about Project Ideas (OH)
Sep 25 Interdependent Valuations II Worksheet, Notes, EFFGK '19
Sep 30 Behavioral Economics and Mechanism Design I Worksheet, Notes, Shengwu's Tutorial
Oct 2 NO CLASS (Yom Kippur)
Oct 7 Behavioral Economics II Worksheet, Notes, Shengwu's Talk
Oct 9 MD4SG I: Health Insurance Markets Worksheet, Notes, EGW '24, EAAMO
Oct 14 NO CLASS (Monday schedule)
Oct 16 MD4SG II: Kidney Exchange Worksheet, Notes
Oct 21 MD4SG III: Democracy, Summary of MD4SG Directions Worksheet
Oct 23 Prophet Inequalities R1.6, KW '12
Oct 28 Balanced Prices: A Multidimensional Extension of Prophet Inequalities FGL '15, DFKL '17
Oct 30 KVV, Prior Independence: Bulow-Klemperer & Single Sample R1.6, H5.2-3
Nov 4 Gains from Trade in Two-Sided Markets BGG '20
Nov 6 Machine Learning and Incentives Chara's Tutorial
Nov 11 Ascending Auctions I R2.1-2
Nov 13 Ascending Auctions II & Walrasian Equilibria R2.2-3,5
Nov 18 Attend BEACH Day!
Nov 20 Linear Programming Duality
Nov 25 TBD
Nov 27 NO CLASS (Thanksgiving)
Dec 2 Project Presentations
Dec 4 Project Presentations
Dec 9 Project Presentations
Dec 16 Project Reports Due 3pm



Huge gratitude to Jason Hartline and Tim Roughgarden for their publicly available materials which have made the development of this course possible.