Survey Talks, Lecture Notes, and Other Resources
Survey Talks:
- Gains from Trade: approximating gains from trade in two-sided markets. [ video ]
- Interdependent Values: a recent history of approximation. [ video ]
- Interdimensional Mechanism Design: optimal mechanisms for settings at the sweet spot between single-parameter and heterogenous. [ video ]
- An Overview of Using Mechanism Design for Social Good [ video | slides ] (TCS+ 2021)
- The Menu Complexity of Multi-Item and Interdimensional Auctions [ part I video | part II video | part I slides | part II slides | website ] (at EC 2018, Ithaca, NY. Co-organized with Yannai Gonczarowski.)
- Open Problems in Mechanism Design for Social Good [ video | slides ] (at WINE 2017, Bangalore, India.)
- MD4SG 2016-18 reading list and lecture notes [ website ] (Co-organized with Rediet Abebe.)
- Article on MD4SG open problems and directions of interest to those in AI [ arXiv ] (with Rediet Abebe.)
- Many many more resources available on the MD4SG website.
Preprints
Multidimensional Bayesian Utility Maximization: Tight Approximations to Welfare
with Taylor Lundy. [ paper ]
Publications
To Regulate or Not to Regulate: Using Revenue Maximization Tools to Maximize Consumer Utility
with Meryem Essaidi and S. Matthew Weinberg, SAGT 2024. [ paper | talk ]
Non-Adaptive Matroid Prophet Inequalities
with Shuchi Chawla, Anna R. Karlin, and J. Benjamin Miller, SAGT 2024. [ paper ]
A Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations
with Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, and Divya Mohan, FOCS 2023. [ paper | talk ]
Private Interdependent Valuations
with Alon Eden and Shuran Zheng, SODA 2022. [ paper ]
On Multi-Dimensional Gains from Trade Maximization
with Yang Cai, Steven Ma, and Mingfei Zhao, SODA 2021. [ paper | talk ]
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents
with Nikhil R. Devanur, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, and S. Matthew Weinberg, EC 2020. [ paper | talk ]
Awarded Best Presentation by a Student or Postdoctoral Researcher
Reducing Inefficiency in Carbon Auctions with Imperfect Competition
with Nicole Immorlica and Brendan Lucier, ITCS 2020. [ paper | talk ]
also appeared in Tackling Climate Change with Machine Learning at NeurIPS 2019.
Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets
with Moshe Babaioff and Yannai A. Gonczarowski, SODA 2020. [ paper | talk ]
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue
with Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, and Anna R. Karlin, EC 2019. [ paper | co-author talk ]
Awarded Best Paper with Student Lead Authors
Journal version in Mathematics of Operations Research, May 2023. [ journal version ]
Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities
with Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, and R. Preston McAfee, EC 2019. [ paper | talk ]
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing
with Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, and Amos Fiat, EC 2018. [ paper | co-author talk ]
Revenue Maximization with an Uncertainty-Averse Buyer
with Shuchi Chawla, J. Benjamin Miller, and Emmanouil Pountourakis, SODA 2018. [ paper | co-author talk ]
A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders
with Anna R. Karlin, WINE 2016. [ paper ]
The FedEx Problem
with Amos Fiat, Anna R. Karlin, and Elias Koutsoupias, EC 2016. [ paper | talk ]
Minimal Partial Languages and Automata
with F. Blanchet-Sadri and Aidan Shackleton, CIAA 2014. [ paper ]
Journal version in RAIRO-Theoretical Informatics and Applications, 2017. [ journal version ]
Dissertation
Mechanism Design for a Complex World: Rethinking Standard Assumptions
PhD Thesis, University of Washington, June 2019. [ thesis ]
Bulletins
A Report on YoungEC '19
ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 18.1, July 2020. [ paper ]
Mechanism Design for Social Good
with Rediet Abebe, ACM SIGAI AI Matters, 4.3, October 2018. [ paper ]
A Report on the Workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good
with Rediet Abebe, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 16.2, June 2018. [ paper ]