Details
Meeting Time: Mondays 4-6pm ET biweekly
Organizers:
- Sam Taggart (Oberlin)
- Kira Goldner (Boston University)
Members:
- Marius Garbea (Drexel)
- Divya Mohan (TAU)
- Taylor Lundy (UBC)
- Manolis Pountourakis (Drexel)
- Narun Raman (UBC)
- Freddy Reiber (Boston University)
- Dan Schoepflin (Rutgers)
- Thodoris Tsilivis (Boston University)
- Matthew vonAllmen (Northwestern)
Description: This group will investigate the topic of mechanism design with inequality and ordeals. Ordeals are payments (or allocations) that negatively impact the agents without transferring positive utility to the seller and are prominent in redistributive applications. The group assumes familiarity with algorithmic mechanism design and the basics of revenue maximization. We meet bi-weekly on zoom. Contact the organizers with any questions, concerns, interest.
Meeting Schedule
This will be kept updating with our reading list and any presentation materials or discussion notes produced.
| Date | Reading | Resources | Speaker |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 21 | Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms [ADK '22] | Slides | Narun |
| Sep 4 | Myerson Refresher: Virtual Welfare, Quantile Space, Ironing, Ex Ante Supply Constraints [Hartline 3.3-5] | Sam | |
| Sep 18 | Single-Parameter Utility Maximization [HR '08/14], Selling the Favorite Outcome and Equiquantile Paths [HH '15/21] | HR Notes | Kira, Sam |
| Oct 2 | Efficient Money Burning in General Domains [FTTZ '15] | Taylor | |
| Oct 16 | Allocating Scarce Resources in the Presence of Private Information and Bargaining Power [FCT '21] | Marius | |
| Nov 13 | CANCELLED |
Freddy | |
| Nov 27 | Market and Non-Market Mechanisms for the Optimal Allocation of Scarce Resources [Condorelli] | Thodoris | |
| Dec 11 | Conditional Cash Transfers, Public Provision of Private Goods, and Income Redistribution [Gahvari Mattos '07] | Matthew |